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1
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are organizations representing women and
men of faith, parents and children, and employees of
numerous organizations. They respectfully ask this
Court to recognize that women’s religious and reproductive liberty should not be defeated by new government regulations that leave contraceptive coverage
unavailable to women employees and their families.
CHILD USA is the leading national non-proﬁt
think tank working to end child abuse and neglect in
the United States. CHILD USA pairs the best social
science research with the most sophisticated legal
analysis to determine the most effective public policies
to end child abuse and neglect. CHILD USA produces
evidence-based solutions and information needed by
policymakers, organizations, media, and society as a
whole to increase child protection and the common
good. #SoKidsStayKids
DignityUSA was founded in 1969 and is an organization of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) Catholics and supporters. Among the areas of
concern outlined in its Statement of Position and Purpose is the promotion of “equal access and justice in all
areas of health care and healing.” DignityUSA is concerned that LGBT people could be denied equal access
1

No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No
persons other than the Amici or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to this brief ’s preparation or submission. All parties
have consented in writing to the ﬁling of this Amicus brief.
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to health care services if employers are allowed to restrict health coverage on the basis of the religious belief of the owners.
New Ways Ministry represents Catholic lay people, priests, and nuns who work to ensure that the human dignity, freedom of conscience, and civil rights of
LGBT people are protected in all circumstances, including in making decisions about healthcare. New
Ways Ministry is a national Catholic ministry of justice
and reconciliation for people and the wider Catholic
Church. Through education and advocacy, New Ways
Ministry promotes the full equality of LGBT people in
church and society. New Ways Ministry’s network includes Catholic parishes and college campuses
throughout the United States.
The Quixote Center is a social justice center
founded in 1976, animated by Catholic social teaching,
committed to the full participation of all people in
church and society. A key expression of this commitment to inclusion in terms of gender and sexuality is
the translation and publication of the Inclusive Bible
and Lectionaries, which engage the organization in
communication with church workers and the broader
community in a variety of Christian denominations.
This broader commitment to gender justice entails a
commitment to reproductive justice and the recognition of equitable access to healthcare as a human right.
The Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics
and Ritual (WATER) is a non-proﬁt educational organization made up of justice-seeking people, from a
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variety of faith perspectives and backgrounds, who
promote the use of feminist religious values to make
social change. WATER believes that women’s health
decisions are private, and that the community’s responsibility is to make health care available for everyone. WATER participates in this Amicus brief because
a just society both respects privacy and promotes
health.
The Women’s Ordination Conference (WOC),
founded in 1975, is the oldest and largest national organization that works to ordain women as priests, deacons and bishops into an inclusive and accountable
Catholic church. WOC afﬁrms women’s gifts, openly
and actively supports women’s voices, and recognizes
and values all ministries that meet the spiritual needs
and human rights of all people. WOC promotes respect
and self-determination of all people based on personal
discernment.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
“[W]e are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people
of almost every conceivable religious preference,”
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). We ask
this Court to respect those preferences by afﬁrming the
judgment of the Third Circuit in this case. Pennsylvania v. President, 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019).
At issue are two government rules that reduce employees’ access to contraceptive insurance. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage
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of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable
Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codiﬁed at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg.
57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codiﬁed at 45 C.F.R. pt.
147). Those rules
authorized all private entities to opt out of the
contraceptive guarantee for religious reasons;
allowed all but publicly traded corporations to
do so for moral reasons; reiterated that compliance with the accommodation was voluntary; and afﬁrmed that the rules do not
impose any notice requirement on employers
that opt out.
Resp’ts’ Br. in Opp’n [to cert petition] 7–8.
On behalf of thousands of employees of religious
organizations and their dependents, Amici urge this
Court to afﬁrm the Third Circuit’s ruling that the government’s amendments to the contraception insurance
coverage rules are illegal. Pennsylvania v. President,
930 F.3d 543, 572 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Because [42 U.S.C.]
§ 300gg-13(a) [(2018)] does not authorize the Agencies
to exempt plans from providing the required coverage,
the Agencies’ authority under the ACA to enact the
Final Rules is without merit.”). The rules limit employee access to contraception in two ways. First, they
exempt more employers from the insurance requirement. Moreover, they end the previous accommodation,
which had required objecting employers to notify someone of their decision not to provide coverage, so that an
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alternative source of insurance coverage could be
found. These new harsh rules leave many women of
faith without contraceptive coverage and force them to
pay for their own contraception.
Although RFRA requires that these employees’
compelling interests in religious and reproductive freedom be considered in any accommodation of their employers’ religious freedom, the government has now
expanded the exemption and ended the accommodation that gave employees coverage. More employers
have now received a complete exemption from the birth
control beneﬁt of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), with
no requirement to tell anyone of their decision. This
overbroad and total exemption unduly restricts employees of faith and their dependents from protecting
their own compelling interests. Thus the government’s
exemption is prohibited by RFRA, which does not permit “requests for religious accommodations [that] become excessive, impose unjustiﬁed burdens on other
institutionalized persons, or jeopardize an institution’s
effective functioning.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 711 (2005) (interpreting RFRA’s parallel statute,
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (2018)).
“At some point, accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion’ ” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla.,
480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). That point is reached here,
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where the government gives Petitioners a complete exemption from the contraceptive beneﬁt. Like the Connecticut statute that unconstitutionally “arm[ed]
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualiﬁed
right not to work on whatever day they designate as
their Sabbath,” the requested exemption in this case
violates the Establishment Clause through its “unyielding weighting in favor of [religious organizations]
over all other interests,” especially the interests of
women of faith in furthering their reproductive health
and protecting their religious freedom. Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
According to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2018), the government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it uses the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest. This
Court has ruled that requiring religious organizations
to provide contraceptive insurance coverage directly to
their employees substantially burdened their religion.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 720
(2014). This Court has never ruled that the organizations’ related accommodation—namely, to notify either
the government or their insurance company of their
moral objection to contraception—placed a substantial
burden on their religion. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136
S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (per curiam) (declining to
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rule on whether the accommodation imposes a substantial burden). Eight of nine courts of appeals
have ruled, however, that the accommodation did not
substantially burden the employers’ religious freedom.2
Nonetheless, the government argues that RFRA
authorized it to pass two new rules on contraceptive
insurance coverage. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg.
57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codiﬁed at 45 C.F.R. pt.
147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to
be codiﬁed at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). These rules had two
consequences that have affected Amici, who include
women of faith who choose to use contraception. First,
the rules expanded the numbers of employers who are
exempt from the insurance mandate. Second, the rules
turned the accommodation into a voluntary choice for
employers, meaning they do not have to notify anyone
2

See, e.g., Little Sisters of Poor House v. Burwell, 794 F.3d
1151 (10th Cir. 2015); Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015); Priests for Life v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir.
2014); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459–63 (5th
Cir. 2015); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 611–15
(7th Cir. 2015); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d
207, 218–26 (2d Cir. 2015); Mich. Cath. Conf. & Cath. Family
Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2015); Eternal
Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1148–51 (11th Cir. 2016); but see
Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2015).
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of their choice not to provide contraceptive coverage.
This has resulted in women losing their no-cost contraception, which the Affordable Care Act (ACA) guaranteed them.
In effect, the administration has removed a nonburden from employers and placed a substantial burden on employees like us women of faith. Government
ofﬁcials were vague in predicting how many employees
would be affected by their new rules. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations Under the ACA, 83
Fed. Reg. at 57,550 (“[T]here is not reliable data available to accurately estimate the number of women who
may lose contraceptive coverage under these rules, and
. . . [there are] various reasons why it is difﬁcult to
know . . . how many women will be impacted by those
decisions.”); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations
Under the ACA, 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,627 (“[G]eneral comments did not . . . substantially assist the Departments
in estimating the number of women that would potentially be affected by these exemptions for moral convictions speciﬁcally. . . . ”). We would like the Court to
understand that women are losing some insurance coverage and also having to pay for contraception themselves. This contradicts the lessons of this Court in
Hobby Lobby, other RFRA cases, and the First Amendment itself—that women should enjoy the no-cost contraceptive insurance that the Affordable Care Act
requires.

9
I.

The Government’s New Rules Have Taken
Benefits Away from Employees.

In Hobby Lobby, this Court approved an accommodation for employers who were otherwise expected to
provide their employees directly with contraceptive insurance, even though the employers morally disapproved of contraception. 573 U.S. at 693. Speciﬁcally,
the employers did not have to provide the insurance
directly. Id. at 731. Instead, their insurance companies
provided it. Id. As this Court explained:
To qualify for this accommodation, an employer must certify that it is such an organization. [45 C.F.R.] § 147.131(b)(4) [(2013)].
When a group-health-insurance issuer receives notice that one of its clients has invoked this provision, the issuer must then
exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer’s plan and provide separate payments
for contraceptive services for plan participants without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on the eligible organization, its
insurance plan, or its employee beneﬁciaries.
§ 147.131(c). Although this procedure requires the issuer to bear the cost of these services, HHS has determined that this
obligation will not impose any net expense on
issuers because its cost will be less than or
equal to the cost savings resulting from the
services. 78 Fed. Reg. 39[,]877 [(July 2, 2013)].
Id. at 698–99. The accommodation system ensured
that the employees would still have access to contraceptive insurance “without cost sharing.” Id. at 692.
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Therefore, this Court concluded, the “effect of the HHScreated accommodation on the women employed by
Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in
these cases would be precisely zero.” Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
Some employers have nonetheless challenged the
accommodation, arguing that it burdened their religion to notify either the government or the insurance
company of their moral position on contraception.
Eight of nine courts of appeals ruled there was no burden in the accommodation. See Little Sisters of Poor
House v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1195 (10th Cir. 2015)
(“It is not a substantial burden to require organizations
to provide minimal information for administrative purposes to take advantage of that accommodation.”); Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
778 F.3d 422, 442 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Under [the Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) interpretation of the RFRA deﬁnition of substantial burden],
can the submission of the self-certiﬁcation form, which
relieves the appellees of any connection to the provision of the objected-to contraceptive services, really impose a ‘substantial’ burden on the appellees’ free
exercise of religion? We think not.”); Priests for Life v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 246
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Accommodation Does Not Substantially Burden Plaintiff ’s Religious Exercise . . .
[i]nstead, the accommodation provides Plaintiffs a simple, one-step form for opting out. . . .”); E. Tex. Baptist
Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Because RFRA confers no right to challenge the
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independent conduct of third parties, we . . . conclud[e]
that the plaintiffs have not shown a substantial burden on their religious exercise.”); Univ. of Notre Dame
v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen
we compare the burden on the government or third
parties of having to establish some entirely new
method of providing contraceptive coverage with the
burden on Notre Dame of simply notifying the government . . . we cannot conclude that Notre Dame has yet
established its right to [a preliminary injunction].”);
Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 220
(2d Cir. 2015) (“Viewed objectively, completing a form
stating that one has a religious objection is not a substantial burden.”); Mich. Cath. Conf. & Cath. Family
Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 752 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“[A]s we held before, ‘[t]he government’s imposition of
an independent obligation on a third party does not impose a substantial burden on the appellants’ exercise
of religion.’ ” (quoting Mich. Cath. Conf. v. Burwell, 755
F.3d 372, 388 (6th Cir. 2014))); Eternal Word Television
Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human
Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1148 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[We] conclude that the government has not put plaintiffs to the
choice of violating their religious beliefs or facing a signiﬁcant penalty. We hold there is no substantial burden.”); but see Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946, 950
(8th Cir. 2015) (relying on Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v.
United States HHS, 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015) to
“conclude that by coercing Dordt and Cornerstone to
participate in the contraceptive mandate and accommodation process under threat of severe monetary
penalty, the government has substantially burdened
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Dordt and Cornerstone’s exercise of religion.”), vacated
sub nom. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. CNS
Int’l Ministries, 136 S. Ct. 2006, 2006 (2016). This
Court heard the employers’ appeal in Zubik v. Burwell,
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). This Court did
not reach a decision on the employers’ argument.
Id.
Instead, this Court’s remand offered a chance to
develop a proposal that “accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that
women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive
full and equal health coverage,’ including contraceptive coverage.” Id. at 1560 (citations omitted). The
Court offered an opportunity for the parties to develop
a resolution. Id. Speciﬁcally, the Court stated that it
made no ruling on whether employers’ religious freedom was burdened, whether the government had a
compelling interest, and whether the regulations were
the least restrictive means of the serving that interest.
Id.
Nothing in Zubik supported a legal conclusion
that women should not receive their no-cost contraceptive coverage. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence urged
that women not be left “in limbo” without contraceptive
coverage as the positions were debated. Id. at 1561
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
The discussion suggested by Zubik did not reach
an agreement. Instead, the administration passed two
government rules that reduce employees’ access to contraceptive insurance. See Religious Exemptions and

13
Accommodations Under the ACA, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536;
Moral Exemptions and Accommodations Under the
ACA, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592. Those rules effectively:
[A]uthorized all private entities to opt out of
the contraceptive guarantee for religious reasons; allowed all but publicly traded corporations to do so for moral reasons;
reiterated that compliance with the accommodation was voluntary; and afﬁrmed that the
rules do not impose any notice requirement on employers that opt out.
Resp’ts’ Br. in Opp’n [to cert petition] 7–8 (emphasis
added).
On behalf of thousands of employees of religious
or moral organizations and their dependents, Amici
urge this Court to afﬁrm the Third Circuit’s ruling that
the government’s amendments to the contraception insurance coverage rules are illegal. Pennsylvania v.
President, 930 F.3d 543, 573 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he
Religious Exemption and the new optional Accommodation would impose an undue burden on nonbeneﬁciaries—the female employees who will lose coverage
for contraceptive care.”). The rules limit employee access to contraception in two ways. First, they exempt
more employers from the insurance requirement.
Moreover, they end the previous accommodation,
which had required objecting employers to notify someone of their decision not to provide insurance. The accommodation and the notiﬁcation allowed for an
alternative source of insurance to provide coverage.
These new harsh rules leave many women of faith
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without contraceptive coverage unless they pay for it
themselves. Id. (“[T]he record shows that thousands of
women may lose contraceptive coverage if the Rule is
enforced and frustrate their right to obtain contraceptives.”) (citations omitted).
In response to the new rules, for example, one
Catholic employer, the University of Notre Dame, said
it would exclude some methods of contraception from
any insurance coverage, and then require co-pays and
deductibles on the others. See Irish 4 Reproductive
Health v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 2020
WL 248009, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2020). Since the
changes to Notre Dame’s insurance coverage, I4RH
Member 1 paid coinsurance for her oral contraceptive;
I4RH Member 2 paid coinsurance for a NuvaRing and
because of cost she switched to an intrauterine device,
for which she pays cost-sharing; all I4RH Members pay
cost-sharing for some contraceptives and are denied
other contraceptives; Ms. Reifenberg’s contraceptive
plan would no longer cover all of her long-acting reversible form of contraception and is subject to a
deductible; and many other Jane Does have paid coinsurance for their contraceptive coverage. Compl. at
¶¶ 12–16, Irish 4 Reproductive, 2020 WL 248009.
There are 70,514,657 Catholics identiﬁed in the
United States. See P.J. KENEDY & SONS, THE OFFICIAL
CATHOLIC DIRECTORY ANNO DOMINI 2116 (2019). The
Amici respectfully ask this Court to consider the interests of employees of Catholic institutions in the United
States. These institutions include 17,328 parishes,
2,868 missions, 358 pastoral centers, 56 new parishes,
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545 Catholic hospitals, 519 health care centers, 1,958
specialized homes, 284 orphanages, 890 day care centers, 2,716 special centers for social services, 69 diocesan seminaries, 58 religious cemeteries, 228 colleges
and universities, 705 high schools (diocesan and parish), 593 high schools (private), 4816 elementary
schools (diocesan and parish), 365 elementary schools
(private), and 126 non-residential schools for the disabled. Id.
The Catholic hospitals alone employ more than
536,396 full-time and 214,936 part-time employees.
See CATH. HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., U.S. CATHOLIC
HEALTH CARE 1 (2020), https://www.chausa.org/docs/
default-source/default-document-library/the-strategicprofile-of-catholic-health-care-in-the-united-states_
2020.pdf ?sfvrsn=0. The professional staff of the Catholic elementary and secondary schools was 146,367.
See Catholic School Data, NAT’L CATH. EDUC. ASS’N,
https://www.ncea.org/ncea/proclaim/catholic_school_
data/catholic_school_data.aspx (last visited Mar. 30,
2020). “Catholic colleges and universities employ more
than 107,000 members.” Jobs: Connecting the Catholic
higher education community, ASS’N OF CATH. CS. AND
UNIVS., https://www.accunet.org/Jobs (last visited Mar.
30, 2020).
Eighty nine percent of American Catholics disagree with their church’s absolute ban on the use of contraception. See Rich Barlow, The World Needs More Birth
Control, Not Less. Can Someone Please Tell the Catholic
Church?, WBUR.ORG (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/
cognoscenti/2018/08/09/catholic-church-sex-contraception-
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rich-barlow (citing Michael J. O’Loughlin, Poll ﬁnds
many U.S. Catholics breaking with church over contraception, abortion and L.G.B.T. rights, AMERICA (Sept.
28, 2016), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2016/
09/28/poll-finds-many-us-catholics-breaking-church-overcontraception-abortion-and-lgbt). Among sexually-active
Catholic women, 99% have used contraception during
their lives, and of at-risk Catholics, 89% currently use
contraception. See GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET:
CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE U.S. 1 (July 2018), https://
www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb_
contr_use_0.pdf; CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE, THE FACTS
TELL THE STORY: CATHOLICS AND CHOICE 2014-2015, 4
(2014), http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/12/FactsTelltheStory2014.pdf. “Contraceptive services and supplies can be costly.” Id.
These new rules violate women’s reproductive and
religious freedom rights. In Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy explained:
Among the reasons the United States is so
open, so tolerant, and so free is that no person
may be restricted or demeaned by government
in exercising his or her religion. Yet neither
may that same exercise unduly restrict other
persons, such as employees, in protecting their
own interests, interests the law deems compelling.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 739 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., does not authorize the government’s proposed new restrictions on
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the health interests of employees. The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit them.
Although RFRA requires that these employees’
compelling interests in religious and reproductive freedom be considered in any accommodation of their employers’ religious freedom, the government has now
expanded the exemption and ended the accommodation that protected the employees’ interests. More employers have now received a complete exemption from
the birth control beneﬁt of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), with no requirement to tell anyone of their decision. This overbroad and total exemption unduly restricts employees of faith and their dependents from
protecting their own compelling interests. Thus, the
government’s exemption is prohibited by RFRA, which
does not permit “requests for religious accommodations [that] become excessive, impose unjustiﬁed burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize
an institution’s effective functioning.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 711 (2005) (interpreting RFRA’s
parallel statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et
seq. (2018)).
In the Catholic world alone, many workers could
lose access to no-cost insurance. To apply RFRA
properly, this Court “must take adequate account of the
burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneﬁciaries.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citing Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)). In contrast to Hobby Lobby, in this case there is no “existing,
recognized, workable, and already-implemented
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framework to provide coverage,” and the “mechanism
for doing so is [not] already in place.” Hobby Lobby, 573
U.S. at 739. Thus the burden on employees’ rights
would be immediate, excessive, and extreme if this
Court were to grant Petitioners’ request to approve the
government’s complete exemption of employers from
the birth control beneﬁt and the accommodation notice.
The new rules also endanger women (and their
children and families) if they cannot get access to nocost contraception, especially in these difﬁcult economic times. Stephanie P. Brown & Sara LaLumia, The
Effects of Contraception on Female Poverty, 33 J. OF
POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 602, 620 (July 2014) (“[W]e estimate that birth control access reduces the probability
that a woman is in poverty by 0.5 percentage points.”);
Anna Bernstein & Kelly M. Jones, The Economic Effects of Contraceptive Access: A Review of the Evidence,
INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL. RES. 5–6 (2019), https://iwpr.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/B381_ContraceptionAccess_Final.pdf (ﬁnding that access to contraception
improved women’s educational attainment, labor force
participation, career outcomes, earnings, and ﬁnancial
position); Kelli Stidham Hall et al., Contraception
and mental health: a commentary on the evidence of
principle for practice, AMER. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 740, 741 (June 2015) (“Prospective populationbased cohort studies and clinical placebo-controlled
trials have consistently reported similar or even lower
rates of depression or mood symptoms in COC [combined oral contraceptive pills] users compared with
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nonusers.”); Kelli Stidham Hall et al., Role of Young
Women’s Depression and Stress Symptoms in Their
Weekly Use and Nonuse of Contraceptive Methods, 53
J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 241, 241 (Feb. 2013) (“women
with moderate/severe stress symptoms had more than
twice the odds of contraception nonuse that women
without stress”); R. Wilcher et al., From effectiveness to
impact: contraception as an HIV prevention intervention, 84 SEX. TRANSM. INFECT. ii54, ii54 (Oct. 2008),
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu/docview/
1781826674?accountid=7107 (“Increasing voluntary
contraceptive use has been an underused approach, despite clear evidence that preventing pregnancies in
HIV-infected women who do not wish to become pregnant is an effective strategy for reducing HIV-positive
births.”); CONTRACEPTIVE USE AND CONTROLLED FERTILITY 156 (Allan M. Parnell ed., 1989) (“[T]he psychosocial consequences to women of contraceptive use . . .
are no less compelling than their physical health and
life chances.”) [hereinafter CONTRACEPTIVE USE]; Adolescents: health risks and solutions, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.who.int/news-room/
fact-sheets/detail/adolescents-health-risks-and-solutions
(“The leading cause of death for 15-19 year-old girls
globally is complications from pregnancy and childbirth.”); see generally CONTRACEPTIVE USE, at 52-54
(various studies have found that use of oral contraceptives reduces endometrial and ovarian cancers,benign
breast disease, ﬁbrocystic disease, pelvic inﬂammatory
disease, iron-deﬁciency anemia, and various types of
ovarian cysts); Sarah R. Crissey, Effect of pregnancy intention on child well-being and development, 24 POP.
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RES. & POL’Y REV. 593, 606 (“pregnancies reported as
unintended are associated with higher risk, with children from unintended pregnancies where no birth control was used having signiﬁcantly higher risks of less
than excellent health compared with children from intended pregnancies where no birth control was used.”).
This Court’s RFRA and RLUIPA “decisions indicate that an accommodation must be measured so that
it does not override other signiﬁcant interests.” Cutter,
544 U.S. at 722. Numerous signiﬁcant interests are at
stake in this case. In addition to the government’s “legitimate and compelling interest in the health of female employees,” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 737, the
employees have religious freedom and reproductive
freedom interests that will be negated if their employers are completely exempted from any obligation to
comply with the law of health insurance. A complete
exemption for Petitioners would not serve any of the
government’s or women employees’ compelling interests.
II.

The Government’s Interpretation of RFRA
Violates the Separation of Powers by Aggrandizing the Executive Branch’s Power
at the Expense of Congress and the Courts.

The Department’s interpretation of its power under RFRA to sweep away duly enacted law is an unconstitutional aggrandizement of its power vis-à-vis
Congress and the courts. For this reason, the attempt
to shield all religious believers from a de minimis
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burden at the expense of millions of women must be
invalidated.
With respect to Congress, under Article I of the
Constitution, Congress has the authority to make the
law. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757–58
(1996); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). The executive branch has the power to enforce the law, and
when it veers into the lane of creating the law, it violates the separation of powers. Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121, 2123, 2129 (2019); id. at 2131
(Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2134, 2135, 2138, 2144
(Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
With RFRA, Congress enacted an accommodation calculus to be applied in speciﬁc cases, not a total-exemption-for-all-believers license.
It is important to understand RFRA’s legislative
history to see just how far the Trump Administration
is going to turn RFRA from a vehicle for judiciallycrafted religious accommodation of a law into a blank
check to gut duly enacted federal statutes to serve certain religious believers. RFRA was passed in 1993 in
response to Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). It was pushed by a group of religious and civil
rights organizations that has since splintered, see
MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF
EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 23–31 (Cambridge Univ.
Press ed., 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter HAMILTON], but
their primary message at the time was that the Supreme Court wrongly decided Smith and Congress
should remedy it. They did not obtain in Smith the
strict scrutiny standard they sought from this Court,
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so they asked Congress to codify their preferred constitutional standard. RFRA is in fact the codiﬁcation of a
new constitutional standard for free exercise—hyper
strict scrutiny. This is a standard that the Supreme
Court had not previously embraced in its free exercise
cases, as this Court pointed out in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997) (stating that the vast
majority of laws, although passing scrutiny under the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, would fail
under RFRA); see also HAMILTON, at 18–21 (laying out
the differences between RFRA and the Supreme
Court’s free exercise doctrine).
The primary objection to Smith was this Court’s
approving nod toward legislative accommodation in
the United States, wherein lawmakers have been the
primary source of accommodation rather than a rule
under the First Amendment that puts courts in the position of having to nullify legislative enactment:
Values that are protected against government
interference through enshrinement in the Bill
of Rights are not thereby banished from the
political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to
the press by the First Amendment is likely to
enact laws that afﬁrmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to
be solicitous of that value in its legislation as
well. It is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their
drug laws for sacramental peyote use.
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (citations omitted). The antiSmith message was that it is unfair to ask religious
entities, especially minority religions, to obtain legislative accommodation. Ironically, at the same time, the
Native American Church achieved peyote exemptions
across the United States. HAMILTON, at 33. The critics
of Smith demanded that Congress enact a statute that
would give such believers greater power to go to the
courts to obtain exemptions. The result was RFRA.
No one was arguing that the federal agencies
should be able to turn case-by-case judicial accommodation into a free pass for religious believers to avoid
whatever law the executive selects. Of course, no one
suggested that. Such an interpretation of RFRA would
be a violation of the Establishment Clause, which does
not permit the government to “aid one religion . . . or
prefer one religion over another” or to “prefer religion
over nonreligion.” Everson v. Dept. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15 (1947); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985). The
possibility that RFRA might be interpreted beyond its
own boundaries always existed, of course, which is why
RFRA includes an explicit provision that states it will
not exceed the Establishment Clause:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
to affect, interpret, or in any way address
that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of
religion (referred to in this section as the “Establishment Clause”). Granting government
funding, beneﬁts, or exemptions, to the extent
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permissible under the Establishment Clause,
shall not constitute a violation of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4.
With respect to the courts, Congress created in
RFRA a private right of action in the courts for those
individuals or entities aggrieved by a law, not a delegation to the executive branch to do whatever it
chooses for believers. The plain language of RFRA provides for a private right of action in the courts for individuals or entities, period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c)
(providing that a person whose religious exercise has
been burdened “may assert that violation . . . in a judicial proceeding”) (emphasis added); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
434 (2006) (“RFRA makes clear that it is the obligation
of the courts to consider whether exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress.”). It is not
a license to permit the executive branch to unilaterally
exempt all religious believers from a law as the Department argues in this case.
There is also strong evidence in RFRA’s companion bill, the RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., that
Congress did not intend for federal agencies to be able
to use RFRA as a sword to slice through duly enacted
laws.3 RLUIPA provides that local governments may
3

After RFRA was held unconstitutional in City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 536, the activists returned to Congress to demand reenactment. There was consideration of a law virtually identical to
RFRA, the Religious Liberty Protection Act, but in the end, Congress passed a new RFRA to be applied solely to federal law, and
RLUIPA, to create causes of action against local and state
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“cure” a potential RLUIPA violation voluntarily before
a lawsuit is ﬁled. “A government may avoid the
preemptive force . . . of this chapter by changing the
policy . . . exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy
. . . or by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden.” § 2000cc-3. There is no such language in
RFRA. Instead, RFRA was intended to be and is by its
plain language, a private right of action for the courts.
Under the Department’s interpretation of its
power in this case, when Congress enacts a judicial
mechanism to obtain accommodation that is triggered
by a law’s substantial burden placed on a religious believer, the federal government can simply nullify the
law in toto for all religious believers. That leap is
simply too far.
Even if the Department’s blanket exemption were
found to be a constitutional exercise of its power, the
infringement on Congress’ power is extreme, and
crosses constitutional boundaries. As the Ninth Circuit
has stated:
[E]ven assuming that agencies are authorized
to provide a mechanism for resolving perceived RFRA violations, RFRA likely does not
authorize the religious exemption at issue in
this case, for two independent reasons. First,
the religious exemption contradicts congressional intent that all women have access to
governments for religious landowners and religious institutionalized persons. HAMILTON, at 28.
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appropriate preventative care. The religious
exemption is thus notably distinct from the
accommodation, which attempts to accommodate religious objectors while still meeting the
ACA’s mandate that women have access to
preventative care. The religious exemption
here chooses winners and losers between the
competing interests of two groups, a quintessentially legislative task. Strikingly, Congress
already chose a balance between those competing interests and chose both to mandate
preventative care and to reject religious and
moral exemptions. The agencies cannot reverse that legislatively chosen balance
through rulemaking.
California v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 941
F.3d 410, 427 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
The drafters of RFRA directed the courts to engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine accommodation through the “substantial burden” calculus.
“Federal courts accept neither self-certiﬁcations that a
law substantially burdens a plaintiff ’s exercise of religion nor blanket assertions that a law furthers a compelling governmental interest. Instead, before
reaching those conclusions, courts make individualized
determinations dependent on the facts of the case. . . .”
Id. at 427–28.
The facts of this case also demonstrate the government regulations violate the Establishment Clause.
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III. The Government’s New Rules Violate the
First Amendment.
“At some point, accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion’ ” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla.,
480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). That point is reached here,
where the government gives Petitioners a complete exemption from the contraceptive beneﬁt. Like the Connecticut statute that unconstitutionally “arm[ed]
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualiﬁed
right not to work on whatever day they designate as
their Sabbath,” the requested exemption in this case
violates the Establishment Clause through its “unyielding weighting in favor of [religious organizations]
over all other interests,” especially the interests of
women of faith in furthering their reproductive health
and protecting their religious freedom. Caldor, 472
U.S. at 709; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.
This Court has distinguished between religious
exemptions and accommodations, which are permitted
by the “play in the joints” between the Religion
Clauses, and religious preferences, which the Establishment Clause prohibits. Compare Amos, 483 U.S. at
334 (discussing how the government is able to “accommodate religious practices . . . without violating the
Establishment Clause”), with Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709–
11 (holding that the Connecticut statute allowing employees that observe a Sabbath to be able to do so
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without any exceptions for special circumstances was
unconstitutional). The government must heed this
Court’s warning that “[a]t some point, accommodation
may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion’ ”
and violate the Establishment Clause. Amos, 483 U.S.
at 334–35 (quoting Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145); see also
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“[t]he principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause”).
The point of unlawful fostering of religion is reached
with the government’s complete exemption.
In Cutter, this Court observed that a religious exemption may violate the Establishment Clause if it
does not take account of the burden of the exemption
on nonbeneﬁciaries. 544 U.S. at 720 (citing Bd. of Educ.
of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994)); see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch.
Dist., 512 U.S. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] religious accommodation demands careful scrutiny to ensure that it does not so burden nonadherents.”). The
government’s two rules have not taken into account
the contraceptive needs of employees and the result is
that employees have to pay for no-cost insurance. The
rules are thus different from the government’s other
exemptions, which generally “involve legislative exemptions that did not, or would not, impose substantial
burdens on nonbeneﬁciaries while allowing others to
act according to their religious beliefs.” Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989).
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In Caldor, this Court approvingly identiﬁed “a
fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, so well
articulated by Judge Learned Hand: ‘The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit
of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.’ ” Caldor, 472 U.S.
at 709–10 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)). Amici endorse this constitutional principle as a matter of faith; as Catholics
Amici believe that every person must enjoy “freedom or
immunity from coercion in matters religious.” Pope
Paul VI, Declaration on Religious Freedom Dignitatis
Humanae on the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious,
THE HOLY SEE 681 (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican.
va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/
vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
Nonetheless, this coercion is precisely what Petitioners
received in this case: the right to block their employees
from contraceptive insurance. In deﬁance of the First
Amendment, the government requests an “absolute
and unqualiﬁed” exemption where “religious concerns
automatically control over all secular interests in the
workplace,” “no matter what burden or inconvenience
this imposes on the . . . workers.” Caldor, 472 U.S. at
708–09.
Neither RFRA nor the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment grants Petitioners a right to complete and costly exemption from the ACA, and the Establishment Clause prohibits it. The exemption does
not take account of the burden on nonbeneﬁciaries and
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is therefore unconstitutional. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at
720 (“courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneﬁciaries, and they must be satisﬁed that the Act’s
prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally
among different faiths”) (citations omitted).
The best way to prevent RFRA from acquiring
such “breadth and sweep” is for this Court “to ensure
that interests in religious freedom are protected.”
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citation omitted). Amici respectfully ask this Court to
ensure that the religious interests of Catholic and nonCatholic workers and their dependents are protected
so that they may “preserv[e] their own dignity” and receive the contraceptive insurance without cost to
which they are entitled. Id. We ask you to afﬁrm the
Third Circuit’s decision.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
The Amici Curiae—CHILD USA, DignityUSA,
New Ways Ministry, the Quixote Center, the Women’s
Alliance for Theology, Ethics and Ritual, and the
Women’s Ordination Conference—respectfully ask this
Court to reject the government’s complete exemption of
employers from providing the birth control benefit
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of the Affordable Care Act and to afﬁrm the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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